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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Allocation Between Employers Of Compensation Award
One of the problems recurring in cases of injury to a workman while in
the joint and concurrent employment of two employers is how to charge the
Workmen's Compensation award against them-in proportion to the respective
wage scales or in proportion to the degree of engagement of the employee in
the service of each employer at the time of the accident.
In Hunt v. Regent Development Corporation,8 the Court held that, although
the facts demonstrated that the employee, a night watchman guarding the
premises of two companies and receiving thirty dollars a week from one and
fifty dollars a week from the other, was at no time disengaged from performing
the duties owed to either employer, the liability must be apportioned to the
wages paid. This decision follows the rule announced in Stevens v. Hull Grum-
mnond & Co.1 where an equal division of liability would have had the
anomalous result of making one employer pay more in compensation than he
had been paying in wages.
A dissenting opinion of Judge Desmond holds that the case of Stevens v.
Hull Grummond & Co. is not applicable, because an equal division in that case
would have violated the express command of the Workmen's Compensation Law
that compensation could not exceed two-thirds of the wages paid.8 Since, in the
instant case, no such situation was present, Judge Desmond felt that the equal
division ordered by the board and affirmed by the Appellate Division should not
be disturbed, such apportionments being properly left to the board where no rule
of law is violated as a result.10
It would seem that there is room for an elaboration of the statutory
definition of such responsibilities, especially in view of the fact that the Workmen's
Compensation Law is not lacking in detailed specification in other areas, as for
example in establishing the awards to be made for particular types of injury.
Assemblyman Not An Employee
The question of whether a New York State Assemblyman is covered by the
Workmen's Compensation Law was presented by the case of Toomey v. New
6. 3 N.Y.2d 133, 164 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1957).
7. 274 N.Y. 227, 8 N.E.2d 498 (1937).
8. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §15.
9. Hunt v. Regent Development Corporation, 1 A.D.2d 862, 148 N.Y.S.2d 794
(mem., 3rd Dep't 1956).
10. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAV §20 provides:
The board shall have full power and authority to determine
all questions In relation to the payment of claims presented
to it for compensation under the provisions of the chapter.
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York State Legislature." The Court decided (5-2) that he is nor. The only
existing opinion on the question, before the Toomey case arose, was rendered by
the state Attorney-General whose opinion was favorable to a finding of
coverage.1
2
With respect to coverage of state employees, originally the legislature
enumerated those employments considered hazardous enough to merit compensa-
tion coverage.' 3 By an amendment in 1924, however, the classification became
"Any employment by the state ..... 14 In the instant case, the majority decided
that a broad construction of the language was not intended and should not be
made. The decision rests on two grounds. The first, since under the original classifi-
cation the legislature made no mention whatsoever of assemblymen or other
elective officials, it must be concluded that the legislature did not intend to
include these officials when it dispensed with express classification and substituted
the broader language quoted above. The second reason given by the majority
was that the concept of a public official is repugnant to that of an employee. The
majority reasoning leaves room for doubt.
While it is established that express classification necessarily excludes those
employments or occupations not mentioned, 15 it does not seem to follow that the
unmentioned employments remain barred after classification is made general.
Certainly it is within the power of the legislature to abandon categorization
entirely, and bring all employments within the scope of coverage. The second
ground, that the concept of public official is repugnant to that of employee, is
equally unconvincing. It was held in People ex rel. Kelly v. Common Council,16
that the office of congressman is a public employment. The holding suggests that
the concepts of "public official" and "employee" are not necessarily contradictory
or repugnant.
These arguments aside, the rules of statutory construction seem to govern
the situation. The language of section 3, group 16, of the statute, is ambiguous.
It is not clear what class of occupations the legislature intended to cover. An
11. 2 N.Y.2d 446, 161 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1957).
12. See 1945 Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. 93, which provides in part:
Where the State is the employer the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law is applicable regardless of the nature of the em-
ployment. No distinction is made in respect to the applica-
bility of the Workmen's Compensation Law between officers
and other employees of the State.
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1922, c. 615.
14. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §3(16) provides:
Any employment by the state, notwithstanding the definitions
of the terms "employment," "employer" or "employee," in
subdivisions three, four and five of section two of this chapter.
15. Maloney v. Levy & Gilliland Co., 176 App. Div. 470, 163 N.Y. Supp. 505
(1st Dep't 1917).
16. 77 N.Y. 503 (1879).
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established rule of construction is that general words are to have a general
operation. 17 It is also a rule, however, that the manifest intent of the legislature
shall prevail over a literal interpretation of the words being construed. 18
Applying these rules to the Toomey case, it does not seem that the majority
has shown any legislative intent that would afford ground for qualifying or
restraining the literal meaning of the words used. The majority appeared
alarmed by the seemingly radical results that might be reached under a broader
interpretation of the section. However, the desirability or undesirability of the
effects of legislation would seem to be purely a matter of legislative judgment,
not to be substituted by that of the judiciary. 19
MISCELLANEOUS
State Not Liable Under Jones Act For Injuries To Its Seamen
In Maloney v. State,' the plaintiff brought an action against the state in the
Court of Claims for the death of her husband, an employee of the state. She
alleged that since her husband was a seaman, such action was permitted by the
Jones Act, a federal statute allowing seamen to recover from their employers
for personal injuries.2 She further alleged that section 8 of the Court of Claims
Act waived the state's immunity and gave the Court of Claims the right to
determine the staite's liability in accordance with the same rules applicable to
action against individuals or corporations in the Supreme Court of New York,
which has jurisdiction over cases arising under the Jones Act.3 However, all
employees of the State of New York are covered by the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law, which provides an exclusive remedy, thus precluding such employees
from bringing an action at law against their employer.4 Therefore, the instant
case presented the question of whether these provisions were applicable to the
plaintiff's action.
The Court of Appeals held that the state did not waive its immunity as
to the Jones Act because section 8 of the Court of Claims Act specifically states
17. In Re DiBrizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 214, 101 N.E.2d 464, 467 (1951).
18. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. N.Y.C.R. Co., 253 N.Y. 49, 170 N.E. 489
(1930).
19. Lawrence Const. Corporation v. State, 293 N.Y. 634, 639, 59 N.E.2d 630,
632 (1944).
1. 207 Misc. 894, 141 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Ct. C1. 1955); 2 A.D.2d 195, 154 N.Y.S.2d 132
(4th Dep't 1956); 3 N.Y.2d 356, 165 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1957).
2. 46 U.S.C.A. §688.
3. Wagner v. Panama Ry., 299 N.Y. 432, 87 N.E.2d 444 (1949): Lynort v.
Great Lakes Transit Corp., 234 N.Y. 626, 138 N.E. 473 (1922).
4. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §11.
